Benefit
Abatement and Future Incomes
Lesley
Davies
MA
Economic Student, Massey University
Our work patterns and
occupations are changing. We are more
likely to be employed in service industries than any other category. We are more likely to be working with
technology.
We are less likely to be
working full time. We are less likely
to stay in the same job all our working lives.
Because of these two changes alone, tenure in paid work has become more
insecure for a great deal of us. The
amount of people wanting more working hours and wanting full time work has
steadily increased over the last 13 years.
While this pattern is
greater for all paid workers, workers at the bottom of the heap are more likely
to be affected by these changes. This,
of course, is hardly new information.
It is linked to the theory of dual labour markets. In the core (primary) labour market are the
jobs with good pay, good working conditions, security of tenure, fringe
benefits, status and prestige. In the
peripheral (secondary) labour market, there is average to poor wages, working
conditions, little or no fringe benefits and not always a lot of status. Also, security of tenure is lacking. Employment in this labour market is
insecure, seasonal, temporary.
And there is also the group
of people, largely reliant on government transfers, who cycle between the
secondary labour market and governmental Income Support. Because the jobs open to them are often
lowly paid and relatively insecure, these people can never quite earn enough to
take themselves off government support and become the working poor.
As security of employment
becomes as great a factor as the income that could be earned from employment,
this third category of people get ever more caught in both the unemployment
trap and the poverty trap. The
unemployment trap occurs when the income support paid means the gap between
being on the benefit and being in work is low enough to make working an
unrealistic option. The rhetoric
accompanying the 1991 benefit cuts was stressed to expand the gap, and thus
provide an incentive to work.
The poverty trap, on the
other hand, is concerned with incremental increases in earnings. In Aotearoa New Zealand, the benefit
abatement system with its income threshold and high rate of clawback is largely
responsible for the poverty trap. As an
unemployed person starts a part time job, the income they would have received
from supplementary benefits, and then the income they would have received from
their main benefits is abated. What
this means in reality, however, is that the beneficiary who works part time can
often face a clawback rate of over 100% in some cases (secondary tax of 33%
added to an abatement rate of 70%) making it impractical to work.
Faced with this marginal tax
rate (the extra tax paid for each extra dollar earned), any incentive to
undertake part time work can be lost.
Partly, this system is a throw back to the concept that either a person
works (and doesn’t require income support) or a person doesn’t work (and does
require income support). As may be
apparent, this was before the surge in temporary and part time work.
The two tables that follow
indicate the growth in part time work in Aotearoa New Zealand between 1987 and
1999. As you can see, the share of part
time work in the economy has increased for both men and women, and the share of
full time work has steadily decreased.
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|
People Working Full and Part Time as a Percentage of All Employed People |
|||||
|
Average for year ended
March |
Males |
Females |
Total |
|||
|
|
Full Time % of Total |
Part
Time % of Total
|
Full Time % of Total |
Part Time % of Total |
Full Time % of Total |
Part Time % of Total |
|
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 |
93.9 93.3 92.8 92.3 91.2 89.9 89.9 90.4 90.4 90.1 89.7 89.1 88.7 |
6.1 6.7 7.2 7.7 8.8 10.1 10.1 9.6 9.6 9.9 10.3 10.9 11.3 |
67.5 67.4 65.7 66.3 64.8 63.9 64.4 64.0 63.4 64.0 62.7 62.8 61.9 |
32.5 32.6 34.3 33.7 35.2 36.1 35.6 36.0 36.6 36.0 37.3 37.2 38.1 |
82.9 82.3 81.2 81.2 79.6 78.5 78.6 78.8 78.4 78.5 77.6 77.3 76.6 |
17.1 17.7 18.8 18.8 20.4 21.5 21.4 21.2 21.6 21.5 22.4 22.7 23.4 |
|
Source: Household Labour
Force Survey. Dept of Statistics |
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|
People Working Full and Part Time (in 000s) |
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Average for year ended
March |
Males |
Females |
Total |
|||
|
|
Full Time |
Part Time |
Full Time |
Part Time |
Full Time |
Part Time |
|
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 |
848.0 834.5 794.1 774.2 758.6 735.7 744.1 772.6 808.6 843.8 857.7 853.3 839.1 |
55.2 59.8 61.9 64.2 73.3 82.3 83.3 82.4 86.3 93.1 98.4 104.4 107.2 |
435.2 442.2 418.1 419.2 419.4 411.3 420.6 431.9 450.8 478.9 488.0 488.5 483.3 |
209.5 214.0 218.6 212.8 228.0 231.9 232.9 242.5 260.5 269.8 289.8 289.7 297.8 |
1283.2 1276.7 1212.2 1193.4 1178.0 1147.0 1164.7 1204.5 1259.4 1322.7 1345.8 1341.8 1322.4 |
264.7 273.8 280.5 276.9 301.3 314.2 316.2 324.9 346.7 362.9 388.2 394.1 405.0 |
Source: Household Labour
Force Survey. Dept of Statistics.
In the table below, it is
clear that if employed, a person is likely to stay employed, and the same if a
person is not in the labour force. Once
unemployed, the likelihood of becoming employed is about 30%, suggesting that
this 30% partly consists of part time and temporary workers, people who cycle
in between welfare and work.
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Transition Probabilities
between Employed (E), Unemployed (U) and Persons Not in the Labour Force (N),
(%) by Quarter |
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|
Quarter |
E® E |
E à N |
E à U |
N à E |
N à N |
N à U |
U à E |
U à N |
U à U |
|
1991 Mar June Sept Dec 1992 Mar June Sept Dec 1993 Mar June Sept Dec 1994 Mar June Sept Dec 1995 Mar June Sept Dec 1996 Mar June Sept Dec 1997 Mar June Sept Dec 1998 Mar June Sept Dec 1999 Mar |
0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 |
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 |
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 |
0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 |
0.88 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.89 |
0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 |
0.23 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.25 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.30 |
0.26 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.28 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.29 0.32 |
0.52 0.49 0.54 0.51 0.54 0.48 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.41 0.36 0.41 0.37 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.41 0.39 |
Source: Household Labour Force Survey.
Dept of Statistics
This cycling of workers
between work and welfare can be more clearly seen if the above table is shown
as figures, rather than probabilities.
The number of people going from Employed to Unemployed (E à U) and Unemployed to
Employed (U à E) is roughly
the same.
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Transition between
Employed, Unemployed and Persons not in the Labour Force (000s) |
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|
Quarter |
E à E |
E à N |
E à U |
N à E |
N à N |
N à U |
U à E |
U à N |
U à U |
|
1991 Mar June Sept Dec 1992 Mar June Sept Dec 1993 Mar June Sept Dec 1994 Mar June Sept Dec 1995 Mar June Sept Dec 1996 Mar June Sept Dec 1997 Mar June Sept Dec 1998 Mar June Sept Dec 1999 Mar |
1009.4 1027.8 1045.2 1033.6 1017.9 1040.6 1059.7 1063.8 1036.5 1055.1 1100.8 923.2 919.7 932.2 970.9 1132.6 1134.1 1176.8 1175.8 1194.3 1153.9 1194.2 1225.7 1194.3 1176.7 1192.0 1165.5 1195.4 1201.1 1226.3 1177.7 1211.1 1027.3 |
55.5 53.2 53.4 50.7 50.7 53.2 50.8 47.8 52.3 50.3 50.1 41.0 45.8 45.2 44.8 53.3 62.3 52.8 54.1 50.3 54.9 57.5 52.3 56.5 60.9 64.3 58.5 55.3 62.0 59.0 56.1 60.6 46.4 |
25.4 23.9 25.8 23.6 25.7 22.5 24.7 24.7 22.3 21.6 20.1 16.7 19.3 15.6 16.1 14.6 16.9 14.7 17.1 14.3 17.4 13.7 17.6 17.2 18.1 19.4 15.6 17.3 22.9 23.2 19.7 21.2 20.6 |
48.7 44.5 43.1 48.6 48.9 45.6 44.2 55.0 50.1 45.6 50.0 47.9 45.3 40.8 45.3 57.3 52.5 51.8 49.1 58.3 58.6 55.1 51.2 48.8 51.5 56.7 50.9 54.2 57.1 52.9 53.5 59.0 49.7 |
591.8 627.9 639.3 630.3 624.5 642.6 674.5 662.3 636.8 660.8 679.7 575.6 538.3 569.8 572.9 650.8 632.6 666.9 670.4 652.8 628.4 652.7 650.2 630.2 621.0 652.5 650.6 661.4 650.1 676.0 669.1 690.0 571.4 |
30.7 28.3 32.0 34.3 32.0 27.5 28.4 32.0 34.2 29.5 25.2 29.6 30.0 22.4 21.8 30.2 27.5 25.1 24.6 30.1 23.6 25.6 28.2 26.0 28.9 26.8 28.0 27.3 29.7 29.4 27.7 34.1 24.5 |
20.3 30.0 25.4 30.0 24.4 33.6 27.0 29.8 28.3 30.4 29.4 24.0 23.0 29.0 22.1 24.6 26.6 27.0 21.5 23.2 21.4 26.4 22.2 23.13 20.2 28.3 23.2 24.7 19.9 28.1 24.0 27.3 22.9 |
23.0 25.9 26.4 29.1 28.0 29.2 25.4 24.9 30.8 29.6 30.4 21.5 27.0 25.3 24.3 24.5 24.6 22.2 22.8 20.8 21.5 25.0 21.4 24.8 21.3 24.1 26.5 22.6 27.3 28.6 28.4 26.1 24.7 |
46.5 52.7 60.3 60.8 62.0 59.1 58.3 58.4 57.7 53.8 53.5 44.6 39.6 41.3 33.7 39.1 33.4 30.9 26.1 25.7 27.7 29.6 29.8 27.1 29.2 30.9 28.4 32.1 33.6 36.8 37.2 37.5 30.0 |
Source: Household Labour Force Survey.
Dept of Statistics
The numbers of people
employed on temporary or seasonal contracts has increased as well. The ending of a contract, temporary or
seasonal job is one of the two main reasons people become unemployed (the other
is being laid off, dismissed or made redundant).
As the level of part time and temporary work is tending to increase, it is possible that the beneficiary numbers will increasingly consist of people who DO, rather than don’t, work. Maybe they will not work all the time, but they will be an important constituent of those who do – and they are also likely to mainly work in the secondary labour market (mentioned earlier).
This increased cycling between benefit only, benefit and work income and work income only will become more noticeable as it begins to affect more of the population, and as the level of full time, well-paid jobs continues to decrease. In time, this may result in changes to our tax and benefit systems.
We may end up with a kind of ‘workfare’ by default. This may lead to dual benefit levels with a main benefit set at a level that requires extra income just to be liveable. The expectation, already formed, that people should work for their benefit will be reinforced by the reality that many beneficiaries already work (paid or unpaid). None of this, of course, affects the numbers of jobs available.
If this is the case, our
present benefit abatement system will severely penalise the group of people who
shift between benefit only, benefit and work income and work income only.
What I have been researching is possible changes in the benefit abatement system we have in Aotearoa New Zealand, with the aim of reducing the likelihood that beneficiaries who do work in the paid workforce are affected by the Poverty Trap (mentioned earlier).
There are two main options:
1.
Changing the threshold of earnings a beneficiary can earn before
abatement happens (currently it stands at $80 before tax on the main benefit,
and $0 on accommodation and supplementary benefits); or
2.
Changing the rate at which abatement
happens (currently 70 cents in the dollar for all income over $80 before tax on
the main benefit, and 25 cents in the dollar for accommodation and
supplementary benefits).
As well as these options, there are:
1.
Changing the tax level (removing secondary tax from work-related
earnings, but not from interest or dividends);
2.
Abate after-tax earnings, rather than before-tax earnings. This seems fairer as the beneficiary is
abated on what they actually receive.
3.
Combine the total benefit entitlement and abate from the total, rather
than at two different thresholds and two different rates. This would make the abatement system easier
to administer, and make it easier for the beneficiary to calculate their total
income and thus budget.